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Latin America is experiencing unprecedented peace and 
stability because democracy has replaced the authoritarian 
regimes of the past.  The Clinton Administration decided in 
1997 to lift the arm sales ban to Latin America after a 
twenty-year moratorium.  This recent change in U.S. arm 
sales policy has renewed a growing concern, among critics, 
that an influx of U.S. weapons to the region will lead to 
an arms race.  This thesis argues that an arms race is not 
occurring in Latin America today.  Three possible 
explanations will be explored to explain the presence or 
absence of arms races in Latin America, they are: 
democratic peace and complex interdependence, economic 
determinants of defense expenditures, and U.S. arms sales 
policy.  Two traditional rival dyads of Brazil/Argentina 
and Peru/Ecuador will be applied to theoretical bases for 
international arms races as well as U.S. foreign policy to 
provide explanatory support.  The major conclusion of this 
thesis is that U.S. foreign policy neither supports nor 
prevents arms races and economic determinants of defense 
expenditures offer mix results at best.  The best possible 
explanation to why an arms race is not occurring in Latin 
America today is the presence of democratic peace and 
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Since the end of the Second World War, the United 
States has been a major world supplier of conventional 
weaponry.  The tremendous surplus of military technology 
after the war enabled the United States to sell advanced 
military hardware to countries that were unable to produce 
it themselves.  The selling of this military hardware by 
the United States was not only a thing of the past, but 
also continues to this day.  One of the markets for this 
equipment is Latin America.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Latin American countries have historically had a 
strong military influence in internal and external security 
issues and government policy.  Although there were only a 
few wars, several regional conflicts and rivalries 
occurred.  By the 1960s, there was a great demand in Latin 
America to upgrade the aging military equipment that was 
sold to them in the 1940s.  Much of the newly desired 
weapons were fighter aircraft and missiles.  In light of 
the difficulties the United States faced from the Vietnam 
War, President Nixon issued a doctrine that encouraged arm 
sales as a means for Latin American countries to defend 
themselves without U.S. assistance.1  In 1977 after a growth 
in human right abuses by several of the military 
dictatorships then presiding in Latin America, President 
Carter issued Presidential Directive 13.  This directive 
eliminated all sales of advanced weapons to Latin America.2 
                     
1
 Mora, Frank O. and Antonio L. Pala.  “US Arms Transfer Policy for 
Latin America.”  Airpower Journal. Vol. 13, Issue 1, Spring 1999.  
ProQuest. Dudley Knox Lib, Monterey, CA. 06 Feb 2003 
http://proquest.umi.com 
2
 Cardamone, Thomas.  “Arms Sales to Latin America.” Foreign Policy 
In Focus.  Vol 2, Number 53, Dec 1997.  www.foreignpolicy-
2 
Through the twenty years of the ban, Latin America 
underwent many political and military changes.  By 1997, 
all the military regimes had been replaced by civilian 
governments with greater control over their militaries.  
Most Latin American countries settled their foreign policy 
differences and reduced their defense budgets and military 
personnel.  These changes, together with lobbying the U.S. 
defense industry, encouraged President Clinton to issue 
Presidential Decision Directive 34, which lifted the 
advanced weapon sales ban to Latin America. 
The lifting of the ban sparked a renewed controversy 
over the issue regarding sales of advanced weapons to Latin 
America.  Advocates of lifting the ban contend that it will 
bring good business to the defense industry, while 
recapturing the lost U.S. military influence in the region.  
Opponents believe the purchasing of unnecessary advanced 
weapons will divert much needed money from social programs 
to combat the growing poverty.  While these are legitimate 
issues, many opponents are more concerned with the 
potential resurrection of another arms race in the region.  
They believe the freedom to purchase arms will spark an 
arms race similar to the one that destabilized the region 
during the early 1970s.  Has lifting of the ban led to an 
arms race in Latin America today as many predicted?  What 
are the possible explanations for why an arms race might 
not occur today? 
This thesis will explore three possible explanations 
for why an arms race is not occurring in Latin America 
today.  It will examine the theoretical bases for 
international arms races using the cases of two 
traditionally rival dyads: Argentina/Brazil and 
                     
infocus.org/pdf/vol2/53ifarms.pdf, August 27, 2002. 
3 
Peru/Ecuador. It will also examine U.S. arm sales policy to 
support these case studies.  The three possible 
explanations that will be explored to explain the presence 
or absence of arms races in Latin America are: democratic 
peace and complex interdependence, economic determinants of 
defense expenditures, and U.S. arms sales policy. 
Chapter II will examine whether democratic peace and 
complex interdependence are relevant in determining peace 
and stability in Latin America.  It argues that the growth 
of democracy and the increase in regional interdependence 
perpetuates relative peace and stability, which would mean 
that the introduction of U.S. advanced weapons, would be a 
moot issue.  The rivalry between Argentina/Brazil and 
Peru/Ecuador will be closely analyzed.  Argentina and 
Brazil will offer a model for how successful complex 
interdependence is at resolving conflict, while the Peru 
and Ecuador rivalry will show the relevancy of democratic 
peace theory. 
Chapter III will examine data and information 
regarding economic determinants of defense expenditures.  A 
review of the on-going debate of the relationship between 
defense expenditures and economic growth will be used to 
establish a platform to analyze the dyads of 
Argentina/Brazil and Peru/Ecuador during the time period 
from 1970-1999.  Gross National Product (GNP) and military 
expenditure data will be compared to establish whether 
defense spending is determined by economic growth or by 
other means.  This will show the predictability of military 
expenditures in Latin American countries.  It will also 
help explain whether an arms race is more likely to occur 
under certain economic conditions. 
4 
Chapter IV will explore U.S. arm sales policy through 
the years 1960-2002.  The first period from 1960-1977 will 
explore the conditions that contributed to an arms race and 
what eventually led the United States to ban sales of 
advanced weapons to Latin America.  The period from 1977-
1997 will look into the shift in U.S. foreign policy in the 
region.  The effectiveness of the arm sales ban will be 
analyzed to explain what led to the Clinton 
Administration’s decision to lift the ban in 1997.  The 
last period from 1997-2002 will be examined to provide 
arguments for and against the lifting of the arm sales ban.  
These issues will provide further evidence to predict 

















II. PEACE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
As the world is becoming more global and 
interconnected, different regions have achieved growth and 
security at widely to different extents.  The collapse of 
the Soviet Union brought an end to a bipolar international 
system, where eliminating Communism was the driving force 
behind the U.S. search for stability in a region.  
Democracy has now become the regime of choice by many 
nations, and the old authoritarian regimes of the past are 
no longer acceptable.  Latin America’s previous conflicts 
raise many questions regarding its ability to remain a 
stable and peaceful region. 
As every other region throughout the world, Latin 
America has had its share of violent conflicts.  These 
conflicts have varied from interstate wars and minor 
skirmishes to civil wars and internal military coups.  
Although the region has experienced all types of 
altercations, there have been relatively few interstate 
wars.  Five of these wars took place in the nineteenth-
century.  The Cisplatine Wars from 1825-1828 and 1839-1852 
settled the territorial disputes between Argentina and 
Brazil by forming the country of Uruguay.  The War of the 
Confederation from 1839-1841 enabled Chile to block a union 
between Peru and Bolivia.  In the War of the Triple 
Alliance from 1886-1870, Paraguay lost territory to 
Argentina and Brazil.  And finally in the War of the 
Pacific from 1879-1883, Chile took territory from Peru and 
Bolivia’s access to the sea.  Since 1945 there have been 
roughly thirty bilateral conflicts that varied from war to 
minor altercations, where the unstable internal environment 
often transmitted uncertainty into the external arena.  
6 
These conflicts can be classified into three categories: 
ideology, territory and resources, and hegemonic.3 
Ideological conflicts affected Latin America through 
the way each nation’s regime viewed its political goals in 
the international system.4  The two regime types that 
potentially caused the most friction were between military 
regimes and democracies.  Latin America had an extensive 
history involving both regime types and the constant 
transitions between the regimes caused instability. 
Territorial disputes have been the most common in 
Latin America.  Many of the disputes dated back to the time 
of independence.  Just about every country in Latin 
American had a border or territory dispute at one time or 
another.  Some reasons for these disputes were access to 
resources, river basins, frontiers, and trade routes. 
The last and less frequent reason for interstate 
conflict was hegemony.  Hegemonic disputes occurred when 
two nations both felt the other was encroaching on the 
other’s region of influence.  Arguably the best example of 
hegemonic struggle occurred between Argentina and Brazil, 
which spanned from independence to the latter part of the 
twentieth-century.5 
Since 1995, most would argue that Latin America has 
become a more stable and peaceful region.  Most of the 
former ideological, territorial, and hegemonic disputes 
have been settled and all regimes are now democratic.  
Nonetheless, a concern remains over the future of Latin 
                     
3
 Grabendorff, Wolf.  “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional 
Potential for Conflict in Latin America.”  Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs.  Vol. 24, Issue 3(August 1982): pp. 270-271. 
4
 Little, Walter.  “International Conflict in Latin America.”  
International Affairs(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).  
Vol. 63, Issue 4(Autumn, 1987): p. 591. 
5
 Ibid, pp. 591-592. 
7 
American stability.  Many scholars argue that the 
reintroduction of U.S. advanced weapon systems into the 
region would destabilize and return Latin America to its 
former unstable self.  The one factor that was not 
previously present in the region that may have led to 
stability and peace was democracy.  Democracy and complex 
interdependence have contributed to the decrease in 
conflicts and the opening of communications between 
previously rival nations.  Nations are now less likely to 
misread intentions, while the institutional setting allows 
for greater restraints on the use of force to settle a 
conflict.  Democratic dyads are three times less likely to 
originate militarized disputes and thirty times less likely 
to originate interstate war, compared to other regime 
types.6 
This chapter will attempt to explain that democracy 
and complex interdependence will continue to provide the 
framework for peace and stability in Latin America, 
regardless of the reintroduction of U.S. advance weapons.  
First the theory of democratic peace and complex 
interdependence will be discussed to provide a foundation 
for discussion of the later case studies. 
The first case study will involve the analysis of the 
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.  The period from 
1970-1999 will be examined because it offers periods of 
interaction between both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes.  This will show that democracies act differently 
towards other democracies and a long-standing rivalry can 
                     
6
 Mousseau, Michael.  “Democracy and Compromise in Militarized 
Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992.”  Vol. 42, Issue 2(April, 1998): pp. 
212-226.   
8 
be solved peacefully through democratic cooperation and 
interdependence. 
The next case study will examine the rivalry between 
Peru and Ecuador.  The time period from 1970-1999 will be 
used to examine the relationship between the two countries 
and how the regime type played a role in establishing peace 
and stability.  The democratic peace theory will explain 
how this recent rivalry was peacefully settled and how the 
chances for future militarized conflicts are diminished 
because of the spreading of democracy in the region. 
A. DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
Many scholars have striven to determine the factors 
that promote peace and stability.  Realists believe that 
the external factors of threat of force, power, and 
security are the answers; while others propose there is a 
more complex solution involving the internal politics of a 
nation.  Regime type has been the focus of this 
explanation.  After much research, scholars concluded that 
democracies almost never fight each other.  If this were a 
true statement, then it would have tremendous implications 
for future international and regional relations.  There are 
now greater opportunities to test this theory as more 
countries are becoming democratic throughout the world.  
However, as with all theories, the definition of terms is 
important. 
There are two important terms that have to be defined 
for the purposes of the democratic peace theory, one is 
democracy and the other is war.  A democracy is defined as 
a voting franchise for a portion of citizens that 
determines government officials through free and fair 
elections, an executive is either popularly elected or 
responsible to an elected legislative body and there is a 
9 
respect of civil rights, including free political 
organization and expression.  Lastly, to qualify as a 
democracy a country has to possess and use these criteria 
for a minimum of three years prior to the war.7 
In terms of war, it is defined as a large-scale 
interstate dispute that is organized lethal violence 
categorized by 1,000 battle casualties.  The particular 
number of deaths is necessary to eliminate accidents, 
unauthorized actions by local personnel, actions meant as a 
test or assertion of commitment, and large demonstrations 
that are not meet with a strong response.8  These terms 
provide the foundation for future analysis, but certain 
design aspects of democracy enable this theory to work. 
The democratic peace functions under structural and 
normative beliefs.  Structural ideas are anchored on the 
premises that democratic institutions are responsible for 
restraining the use of force in a crisis.9  The democratic 
institutions provide a system of check and balances that 
prevent any branch of government from obtaining more 
control over the other branches.  Additionally, policy 
makers in a democracy must gain approval from other policy 
makers and their constituents in order to carry out their 
war desires.  Both of these structural designs restrain the 
use of force in a crisis because it delays military action 
and also demonstrates to other nations that there are 
constraints on action.10  However, the structural approach 
                     
7
 Russett, Bruce.  Grasping the Democratic Peace.  New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993: pp. 14-15. 
8
 Ibid, p. 12. 
9
 Owen, John M. “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace.”  
International Security.  Vol. 19, Issue 2(Autumn, 1994): p. 90. 
10
 Russett, pp. 39-40. 
10 
is not the only way to restrain the use of force in a 
democracy.  Normative views also play a part. 
Normative views are values created by the democratic 
system.  The democratic system symbolizes the liberal ideas 
of self-preservation and material well being, regardless of 
cultures and beliefs.11  It is these ideas that not only 
govern a democratic nation, but also influence 
relationships with countries.  Normative ideas of social 
diversity, limited government, coalitions, individual 
rights, and toleration of dissent by a loyal opposition all 
restrain the use of force.12  When democracies are in 
conflict with other democracies these norms are effective 
because each side understands and operates under the same 
ones.  A potential military crisis will eventually be 
resolved through compromise and cooperation.  Democratic 
norms also promote interdependence among democracies to 
achieve greater security and growth. 
B. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE 
Fundamental beliefs in a democratic system allow for 
nations to become closely linked.  Each democracy offers 
other democracies particular goods, services, money, 
security, people, and communication.  These relationships 
of shared goods and services produce interdependent or 
mutually dependent relationships when there are reciprocal 
costly effects for these connections.  There are three 
essential features to complex interdependence: multiple 
channels, limited role of use of military force, and no 
hierarchy among issues.13 
                     
11
 Owen, pp. 90-94. 
12
 Russett, p. 31. 
13
 Keohane Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye.  Power and Interdependence.  
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977: pp. 8-9.   
11 
There are several ways countries may communicate and 
establish multiple channels with each other.  The 
government may form connections among its lower level staff 
members, while simultaneously having official meetings and 
discussions that are recorded and viewed through the press.  
Meetings and communication may also occur through non-
government participants like businesses and transnational 
corporations.  As communication increases and political and 
economic ties become stronger, the need for military force 
to resolve differences diminishes. 
Military force has fallen from the top priority in 
many democratic nations.  Interdependence has intertwined 
democracies on political, economic, and cultural levels.  
These countries are no longer concerned or rarely 
threatened by other democratic countries with which they 
are interdependent.  However, the use of military force may 
not be disregarded because it still serves a purpose.  The 
military may be used as a bargaining or persuasive tool.  
At the same time, if certain events threaten the livelihood 
of a nation, then the military will also be used to ensure 
the nation’s survivability. 
Several issues may be discussed through government and 
non-government channels.  The issues range from economics, 
security, population, and ideology, just to name a few.  
Since there are many issues that all deserve equal 
attention, it is important that one issue does not 
consistently take priority over the others.  This will 
allow for a more coherent and flexible foreign policy.  As 
nations are becoming more connected and have similar 
12 
concerns, the agendas of democratic governments are driven 
by factors in both the international and domestic arenas.14 
Interdependence does not only apply to the political 
arena, but also to the economic arena.  Often both 
international and domestic events are influenced by the 
economy.  As more countries are becoming interdependent, 
changes in economic conditions affect all connected 
nations.  When connections become more complex and 
integrated they have a tendency to reduce interstate 
conflict.  The more open an economy is to accepting foreign 
trade and capital flow from others, the less likely a 
militarized conflict will result from a conflict in 
interests.15  Traditionally, economic relationships are more 
complex than political relations.  As history has shown, it 
is easier to sever political ties with a country than it is 
to sever economic ties.  Economic ties do not only affect 
the countries involved in the conflict, but they also 
affect other countries around the world.  Many corporations 
are transnational and have interests in multiple nations 
simultaneously, so by severing economic ties there will be 
an unintended ripple affect causing damage in neighboring 
countries.16  An important economic tie exists in the form 
of trade agreements.  Since many political leaders and 
interest groups also have economic interests, trade becomes 
an integral part of interdependence. 
Trade permits goods and services to be exchanged 
across international boundaries.  These goods and services 
benefit both countries by allowing the fulfillment of 
                     
14
 Ibid, pp. 24-29. 
15
 Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett.  “The Classical Liberals Were 
Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.”  
International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 41, Issue 2(June, 1997): p. 288. 
16
 Ibid, p. 270. 
13 
supply and demand, stable prices, and profits.  Trade also 
gives businesses and citizens a stake in another country’s 
affairs because the political and economic actions of other 
countries affect business.  The influential stake in other 
countries prevents a militarized conflict because it 
provides an avenue for communication, while instability 
detracts from investment and future development.17  From the 
years 1970-1997 the world wide economic growth more than 
doubled, trade quadrupled, and foreign direct investment 
increased by 700 percent.18 
By the results of these figures it would appear that 
as the more integrated and globalized countries are 
becoming the more likely interest groups and political 
leaders will be to avoid using force against another 
economically interdependent nation.  It has been shown that 
both democracy and interdependence can be influential in 
determining peace and stability between nations.  So as 
traditionally rival nations evolve and assimilate 
democratic and interdependent characteristics is expected 
that the long-standing conflicts will be resolved 
peacefully. 
C. ARGENTINA/BRAZIL 
Of all the rivalries in Latin America, the one between 
Argentina and Brazil has been the most unique because it 
was an aggressive pursuit for hegemony that concluded 
peacefully.  This rivalry centered on the struggle to gain 
access to valuable resources.  However, this was not the 
only aspiration each country shared.  They also wanted 
unchallenged regional hegemony.  Argentina and Brazil were 
                     
17
 Russett, Bruce and John Oneal.  Triangulating Peace.  New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2001: pp. 129-139. 
18
 Ibid, p. 141. 
14 
the only two countries in the entire Latin American region 
to take on a persistent hegemonic struggle that eventually 
was transformed into cooperation and interdependence.19 
The struggle between these two countries can be traced 
back to the beginnings of Latin American independence.  By 
the late 1800s Brazil was closely monitoring Argentine 
economic and political activity for signs of aggression.  
There was a strong looming fear in Brazil that Argentina 
was secretly trying to isolate them from the rest of Latin 
America.  Brazil believed that Argentina was establishing 
powerful political and economic relationships based on 
previous Spanish colonial ties with the neighboring 
countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.20  This fear 
still existed in the mid 1980s.  Argentina was also 
concerned about Brazilian aspirations for regional power 
and movements towards dominating economic resources.  
Unfortunately, Argentina’s feeling of racial and cultural 
superiority fueled the rivalry even more.21  Although the 
intense rivalry lasted for a long time, it abruptly came to 
a halt during the late 1970s under shaky authoritarian 
regimes because of Argentina’s brewing crisis with Chile 
over the Beagle Channel and Brazil’s increased political 
liberalization.22  This led to the beginning of cooperation 
in the 1980s under the auspices of newly elected democratic 
regimes. 
                     
19
 Little, p. 592. 
20
 Hilton, Stanley H.  “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century 
Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy.”  Political Science Quarterly.  Vol. 
100, Issue 1(Spring, 1985): p. 28.  
21
 Selcher, Wayne A.  “Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: 
From Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition.”  Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs.  Vol. 27, Issue 2(Summer, 1985): p. 26. 
22
 Resende-Santos, Joao.  “The Origins of Security Cooperation in the 
Southern Cone.”  Latin American Politics and Society.  Vol. 44, Issue 
4(Winter, 2002). 
15 
Economically, both countries were trying to manipulate 
hydroelectric resources from the La Plata River Basin.  
Brazil desired to improve its regional economic advantage 
with Paraguay and Bolivia while at the same time 
diminishing Argentina’s.  Brazil dramatically increased 
exports to Bolivia from 7.6 million in 1970 to 120 million 
in 1975.  Even Brazil’s Petrobras purchased sixty percent 
of Bolivia’s oil exports as well as financed a gasoline 
pipeline that would transport oil between the two 
countries.  Trade increased to Paraguay as well.  Trade 
grew from 3 million in 1960 to 100 million in 1975, but 
this was not the only improvement.  In conjunction with 
Paraguay, Brazil launched a plan for the development of a 
hydroelectric dam, Itaipu, on the Parana River.23  This 
provided Brazil with a tremendous lead over Argentina in 
the regional hegemonic race.  In response to Brazil’s 
development, Argentina attempted to develop another dam, 
Yacireta, with Paraguay down river near Corpus.24  Brazil 
and Argentina’s dams adversely competed with the other and 
may have caused potentially treacherous waters further down 
river in Argentine territory if an agreement was not 
reached. 
The agreement between Brazil and Argentina over the 
hydroelectric dam began while both countries were under 
authoritarian governments.  After failing to gain from a 
settlement in the international arena, Argentina initiated 
the settlement directly with Brazil.  The driving force 
behind this decision was the overwhelming importance of 
                     
23
 Hilton, pp. 46-47. 
24
 Resende-Santos, Joao. 
16 
other strategic interests involving Chile and the Beagle 
Channel.25 
However, this agreement cannot be categorized as a 
cooperative engagement, but instead it can be called the 
settlement of a competition in which Brazil gained the 
advantage. In order to classify this agreement as 
cooperation both countries would have compromised and 
sacrificed a potential advantage for the collective good.  
This did not happen.  However, the beginnings of 
cooperation were pursued in 1986 by the democratic regimes 
of both countries.  The Argentine-Brazilian Integration and 
Cooperation Pact (ABEIP) was created to formally end 
competing economic concerns by uniting both markets and 
reducing protectionist measures.  The ultimate goal of this 
pact was to bring stability through trade, decrease 
dependency on the international market, and increase 
growth.26 
Although the economic success of the pact was 
questionable, it provided the initial cooperative framework 
that eventually led to the creation of MERCOSUR in 1991.  
This common market has contributed to a tremendous amount 
of export growth in Latin America and at least forty eight 
percent of the exports stayed among MERCOSUR members.27  
Settlements and cooperation were not exclusively limited to 
economic issues, but were also for security concerns.  
Another issue that had similar results to the hydroelectric 
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dam dispute was the competition for nuclear power 
development. 
Both Argentina and Brazil aspired to become a nuclear 
power.  In 1968 both countries pulled out of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ignored the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco.  The ignoring and rejecting both treaties 
allowed the race for nuclear development to begin.  
Argentina believed nuclear power was the only way to gain 
the hegemonic advantage over Brazil.  Initially, 
Argentina’s nuclear capability expanded with the 
development of the natural uranium reactors, which 
potentially were more useful than the enriched uranium 
counterparts.28  However, by 1975 Brazil entered into a 
contract with West Germany providing it with full-cycle and 
enriched uranium technology.29 
In 1976, both countries determined that they both were 
capable and viable nuclear powers.  However, the same 
outside strategic problem, the Beagle Channel dispute with 
Chile, also plagued the continuation of Argentina’s 
successful nuclear program.  Again Argentina initiated a 
settlement with Brazil regarding the control and 
development of nuclear energy in the region because the 
authoritarian regime sensed that its power was 
deteriorating at home and abroad.  In 1980, an accord was 
created to collaborate any future nuclear technological 
developments over a ten-year period and sales of materials 
and equipment.30  The accord did not halt the race for 
nuclear development, but opened the door for future 
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agreements and cooperation to place restraints on both 
nuclear programs. 
The loss in the war for the Falkland Islands against 
Great Britain and the settlement of the Beagle Channel 
dispute with Chile greatly contributed to the redirection 
of Argentine foreign policy in the early 1980s.  The fall 
of the authoritarian regime in Argentina in 1983 and in 
Brazil in 1985 encouraged the development of cooperation on 
the nuclear issue because the ideologies changed with the 
passing of regimes. 
Now relations were viewed through integration and 
interdependence instead of competition and conflict.  
Argentina also realized that it could no longer compete on 
the same scale as Brazil.  Brazil had become the eighth 
largest economy with a population of 120 million people, 
while Argentina only had 30 million people.31  So the only 
way for Argentina to still hold on to some power in the 
region was to come to a cooperative agreement with its 
neighbor, Brazil.  In 1985 a Joint Declaration on Nuclear 
Policy was signed and later the Argentina-Brazil Agency for 
the Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) 
was developed to monitor and control nuclear materials.  By 
1995, Argentina agreed to sign the NPT and Brazil followed 
suit in 1998.  The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil 
ultimately concluded with cooperation and interdependence, 
democratic peace did not play a role in determining the 
outcome.  However, the rivalry between Peru and Ecuador did 
erupt into a militarized conflict of more than words and 
the democratic peace theory has more power to explain the 
return of peace in this case. 
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D. PERU/ECUADOR 
The conflict between Peru and Ecuador has been the 
longest standing border dispute in Latin America.  The 
dispute spans over a hundred-year period, which includes 
several attempts to resolve the crisis through both 
military and peaceful means.  The disputed area has little 
to do with any strategic or economic importance.  Instead 
Peru and Ecuador view this issue through nationalistic 
terms. 
Ecuador insists it has a sovereign right to the 
territory, while Peru considers the territory in question 
its own.  Peru justifies its claim citing the Rio Protocol 
of 1941 and the Braz Dias de Aguiar arbitral award of 1945 
as the official settlements regarding the disputed 
territory.  However, Ecuador maintains the treaty was 
signed under duress and was difficult to execute due to 
geographic anomalies.  The anomalies resulted from an 
uncharted river and mountain spur in the Cordillera del 
Condor and Cenepa River area.  Since 1946, when the 
anomalies were discovered, militarized conflicts have 
occurred in that area until 1998.  Unfortunately, Ecuador’s 
position is viewed as the weaker of the two because the Rio 
protocol is a legally binding international law.32 
The continuing dispute between Peru and Ecuador was 
apparent because several skirmishes occurred between the 
years of 1977 and 1998.  During these skirmishes, each 
country had either an authoritarian or a democratic regime 
and a preponderance of military power.  A crisis occurred 
in 1978 regarding the border while both governments were 
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experiencing a transition to democracy after several years 
of military rule.  Ecuador held elections in 1978, which 
marked the return of civilians to power.  The new 
government, headed by President Roldos, reaffirmed 
Ecuador’s stanch position on the border issue.  However, 
Peru maintained the preponderance of military power and the 
skirmish did not escalate.  The Paquisha Incident erupted 
in 1981 because Ecuador built military outposts in the 
disputed territory.  This action provoked a Peruvian 
response, but was soon settled by other Latin American 
nations acting as arbiters.  Although both countries were 
democracies during the event, the total battle deaths 
averaged around 200.33 
Tensions erupted again in 1991 when Peruvian forces 
penetrated the disputed border in the area of Pachacutec.  
Crisis was averted again when the two democratic 
governments agreed to talk to establish a neutral security 
zone.  These talks were possible because President Fujimori 
of Peru desired to resolve the conflicts with neighboring 
countries.  Since Peru was experiencing bad economic times, 
President Fujimori tried to make it appear that Peru was 
more interested in economic openness and stability than 
waging militarized conflicts.34  However, President Fujimori 
would not maintain his political desires for much longer. 
By 1992 the political climate had changed in Peru.  
President Fujimori dissolved the congress and suspended the 
constitution in an autogolpe that year.  This political 
move gave rise to an increase in military influence 
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throughout the country.  This was seen as necessary to 
combat the rapidly growing internal guerrilla conflict.  
Unfortunately, the rise in military influence also aided in 
antagonizing the border issue.  The authoritarian style 
government changed its views on how to handle foreign 
policy.  Previously, President Fujimori was more willing to 
negotiate with Ecuador over the border issue, but the 
recent autogolpe altered his view by fully supporting the 
provisions of the Rio Protocol.35  These political changed 
combined with troop movements along the border sparked a 
renewal of fighting between Peru and Ecuador in January 
1995. 
Fighting started in the disputed area when Ecuadorian 
troops attempted to remove Peruvian forces from Base Norte 
located near the Cenepa River.  Ecuador had increased its 
force strength in the disputed region since the last 
skirmish in 1991.  In the end, the conflict lasted just 
over five weeks and has been the worst fighting since the 
1941 war.  Deaths on both sides have been estimated at over 
1,000, but much lower figures of 100 to 300 have also been 
reported.  Peru lost nine aircraft, while both countries 
expended roughly $500 million combined on military 
operations.36  Ecuador appeared to be the victor and a 
cease-fire was enacted.  However, the negotiations did not 
go as planned and it took three years to develop a 
successful settlement.  In 1998, after a minor flare-up of 
tensions, six bilateral accords were created.  These 
agreements essentially demarcated the border, while making 
it flexible enough to satisfy both countries desires.  
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However, it was not until 1999 that the accords were 
finalized and signed.37 
The latest outbreak of hostilities in 1995 raised many 
questions over the potential instability of Latin America.  
Depending on some casualty reports, the Cenepa conflict has 
been classified as a war according to the democratic peace 
theory and a majority of the international community.  Some 
experts believe this conflict is the first example of a war 
between two democracies, but the political scenario offers 
a different perspective. 
Ecuador was considered a democracy even though the 
political climate was under tremendous stress.  President 
Ballen had minimal control the military, which prevented 
diplomatic solutions from settling the conflict.  For the 
next three years, Ecuador went through three different 
presidents.  However, the democratic institutions remained 
in place throughout the entire period of instability.  In 
Peru it was different.  President Fujimori had been in 
power since 1990.  On a personal level, he brought 
experience and continuity to the border issue for Peru.  
However, on the political level he completely changed the 
democratic institutions of the country.  After 1992, it is 
questionable whether democracy remained in Peru.  The 
changes to the constitution benefited President Fujimori 
and his authoritarian style policies.  This caused many of 
the people’s rights and civil liberties to be revoked to 
aid the fight against the insurgent guerillas.  Based on 
the Polity Scale, Peru received a +2 during the years 
surrounding the 1995 conflict.  This made Peru an anocratic 
state, a mixture between a democratic and authoritarian 
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government.38  Since Ecuador was considered a democracy and 
Peru was an authoritarian regime masked by democratic 
tendencies, the Cenepa War in 1995 failed to disprove the 
democratic peace theory. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Latin America has been a region plagued by conflict 
over the years.  These disputes have contributed to 
instability and a lack of investor confidence that has had 
an adverse affect on political relations and economic 
growth.  It is important to understand how these rivalries 
and conflicts were created, while at the same time to 
understand how they can be prevented in the future.  The 
conflicts and rivalries in the region can be categorized 
into three groups, ideological, territory and resources, 
and hegemonic.  While these are all important, territory 
and resources, and hegemonic rivalries provide the 
fundamental principles in understanding conflict in the 
region.  By understanding the root causes of conflict, it 
will be easier to find a way to prevent them from occurring 
in the future. 
Democracy and complex interdependence have greatly 
contributed to the decrease in conflicts and the opening of 
communications between previously rival nations.  
Democratic nations are less likely to misinterpret 
intentions because they share common normative and 
structural components.  The normative components are ideas 
and beliefs founded on the liberal view of self-
preservation and material well being regardless of cultures 
and beliefs.  The structural component ensures there are 
common checks and restraints placed on the system to limit 
the use of force in a conflicting situation.  The Peru and 
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Ecuador case study illustrates how democracies have never 
gone to war with each other.  During the time when there 
was a non-democratic regime involved, the outcome was war.  
So while these two countries remain democracies, the 
prospects for future war are minimal, no matter how many 
new weapon systems or troops either country obtains. 
Complex interdependence offers another reason for the 
lack of future conflicts in Latin America.  Interdependence 
ensures that the reciprocal exchange of goods and services 
comes at a cost to both parties involved.  When both 
parties shoulder and accept the involved costs, it 
encourages the opening of multiple communication channels, 
a more limited role for the use of military force, and no 
hierarchy to be established among issues.  These key 
elements of interdependence ensure that there will be too 
much at stake to risk the use of force to settle a 
disagreement.  The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil 
offers an example of how interdependence settled a long-
standing race for regional hegemony.  The cooperative 
measures both countries made to resolve their hegemonic 
aspirations in the attainment of hydroelectric power and 
nuclear energy ensured a long lasting peace that remains to 
this day.  Although initial settlements were made under the 
auspices of authoritarian regimes, it was eventually 
democracy that solidified the cooperative resolution that 








III. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
For the last three decades, Latin America has been 
purchasing arms from suppliers around the world.  Many 
policy makers and scholars assumed that when the arm sales 
ban was placed on the region in 1977 that the level of arms 
purchases would slow down, but in fact they did not.  By 
the time the ban was lifted in 1997, an old argument 
resurfaced about the future of Latin American arms 
purchases.  The belief was that a sudden rush to purchase 
arms would occur, effectively initiating an arms race in 
the region.  The build-up of advanced weapons would 
potentially threaten to reintroduce a powerfully political 
military into the young and thriving democratic nations.  
If these authoritarian governments were to return to power 
then the stability of the region would be in jeopardy. 
As seen in the past, an arms race has several negative 
effects.  These negative effects are not only echoed on the 
international level, but also felt on the domestic level.  
The domestic level has the most to lose from an arms race.  
As the nations race to purchase more advanced weapons to 
maintain an advantage over its rival, the increase in the 
required funds has to be supplied from somewhere.  Policy 
makers have to make an economic choice on the domestic 
level to whether they will continue to expand the 
military’s budget and purchase weapons to support the arms 
race or use that money to fund other programs.  The other 
programs that usually get sacrificed for an increase in 
military spending are social programs.  Many of these 
social programs include education, health, and welfare.39  
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These programs are important to Latin America’s future 
development domestic politics.  Over the last decade, the 
region’s poverty level has remained unchanged at thirty-six 
percent.  Additionally, the amount of extreme poverty has 
increased, climbing to sixteen percent in 1997 from 
thirteen percent in 1987.40  As the military’s budget 
expands their influence grows institutionally in the 
government.  By the time the government has mismanaged, 
under funded, and failed to improve the social structure, 
the powerful military has decided to take over and 
alleviate the government.  To prevent the return of the 
military coups of the 1960s-1970s, it is essential to 
understand the economics behind an arms race. 
By analyzing the key variables to an arms race, a 
predictable solution can be developed to prevent them from 
occurring in the future.  Some have concluded that the 
regime type of a nation is the most responsible for the 
kinds and the amounts of arms purchased.  Others have 
believed that the accountability should be placed on the 
foreign policy of the arms selling nation.  However, 
another just as important variable to consider is 
economics.  Economics determine the quality and quantity of 
weapon systems and the ability of a nation to afford the 
purchase.  Ultimately, the question of whether an arms race 
is occurring in Latin America today cannot be fully 
answered without comprehending the economic aspect of the 
issue. 
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Many of the arms-building models of the 1960s focused 
on the study of arms races.  As the times have changed so 
have the methods.  Recently researchers have shifted their 
attention from arms races towards arms expenditures.  Not 
only did the focus shift, but also the explanations have 
changed from an action-reaction process to a domestic 
process.41  An analysis of the domestic process should begin 
with the defense budget.  The understanding of the economic 
determinants of defense expenditures will ultimately help 
analysts predict and determine whether an arms race is 
occurring in Latin America today. 
This chapter will examine the hypothesis that changes 
in the economic condition of the country determine defense 
expenditures.  The dependent variable will be the level of 
military expenditures, while the independent variable to 
explain this hypothesis will be Gross National Product 
(GNP) over time.  The national income is important because 
it provides the country with the ability to successfully 
fund its military expenditures.42  This hypothesis will be 
used to explain whether the lifting of the arms sales ban 
in 1997 has initiated an arms race in the region.  Although 
economics will not be the only factor in making the arms 
race decision, it will greatly contribute.  This chapter 
will initially establish what are the various arguments 
regarding the relationship between defense spending and the 
economy and apply them to Latin America as a region.  This 
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will provide the necessary theoretical framework to conduct 
a more detailed analysis of the two particular dyads. 
The first case study will involve the dyad of 
Argentina and Brazil.  These two countries have been 
selected because of their long-standing traditional rivalry 
involving arms build-ups.  An in depth analysis of the 
individual defense budgets compared to GNP will be 
evaluated over the time period from 1970-1999 to determine 
a relationship.  Additionally, the defense expenditures of 
these two countries will be compared against each other to 
determine a reactionary rival relationship. 
The next case study will involve the dyad of Peru and 
Ecuador.  This dyad was chosen based on their traditional 
rivalry and most recent conflicts.  Analysis of the 
individual defense expenditures compared to GNP will be 
analyzed to determine a causal relationship between 
spending and the economy.  Additionally, the defense 
expenditures of these two countries will be compared 
against each other to determine a reactionary rival 
relationship. 
A. THEORETICAL VIEW 
There are several economic variables that play a role 
in determining defense spending.  These include external 
debt, the cost of hyperinflation, and the level of 
nonmilitary spending43, overall GDP constraint, and fiscal 
funding (primarily government expenditures and government 
revenues)44 just to name a few.  All of these variables have 
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the potential to either drive or be driven by defense 
spending.  There is an on-going debate among scholars on 
whether economic growth determines military expenditures or 
whether military expenditures determine economic growth.  
Although neither viewpoint is absolutely correct, it is 
important to understand both arguments. 
The initial study conducted by Emile Benoit determined 
that defense programs encouraged economic growth.  The 
defense programs that encouraged growth were technical 
education, health care, and housing to military members.  
The study concluded that not only were these programs 
desirable and valuable to the military, but also provided 
benefits to the civilian sector.45  The technical skills 
military members obtain during service are transferable to 
the civilian sector.  These highly trained personnel come 
to the civilian sector free of charge, so ultimately money 
is saved.  Another area in which military spending 
positively affects the economy is through the financing of 
heavy industry.  Industrial development is an important 
part of the defense expenditures.  Many of the newly 
developed technologies created by the military get used in 
the civilian sector.  Some of these technologies include 
air transportation, nuclear power, fiber optics, radar, and 
space technologies.46  Although they initially divert funds 
away from the nonmilitary expenditures, they are ultimately 
repatriated to the civilian sector.  However, not all 
economists believe military spending positively affects 
economic growth. 
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Other scholars argue that there is a negative 
relationship between the defense spending and growth that 
manifests itself in the form of a “Guns vs. Butter” trade-
off.  An increase in defense expenditures often results in 
an increase in the balance of payments debt.  This is 
because some exports have to be diverted to internal demand 
and the resulting foreign exchange is lost.  Imports 
typically rise due to military equipment and weapon system 
needs.  While these imports are good for the military, they 
are non-consumable items that do not contribute to making 
profitable growth.47  Another area that potentially suffers 
due to increased military spending is education and health.  
These social programs are essential to economic growth.  
The countries that have the most evidence of this trade-off 
are those that are resource constrained.  These countries 
have very little fiscal flexibility with the national 
budget.  So when defense expenditures increase the money 
has to be diverted from other areas whether it is through 
taxation or debt accruing loans.  The military does 
contribute to human-capital growth, but the learned skills 
are limited to defense sector applications.  These limited 
skills fail to generate growth spillovers to the civilian 
sector.48 
On the other side of the debate lie the scholars that 
believe economic growth determines defense expenditures.  
The argument is fundamentally simple, when the economy is 
performing poorly; military spending is reduced to aid the 
other failing sectors of the economy.  Additionally, when 
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the governments are democratic, fiscal crises often place 
pressure on the government to reduce defense spending to 
appease the constituency, repay external debt, and regain 
economic growth.49  The military is the first sector to 
undergo budget cuts during a fiscal crisis because it is 
seen as a “superior good” to many countries.  The “superior 
good” is a luxury item and not a necessity, so when there 
is negative economic growth then the military expenditures 
decrease.50  While no one variable is more responsible for 
determining military expenditures, the following two case 
studies will be analyzed to determine if economic growth, 
either positive or negative, influences military 
expenditures. 
B. ARGENTINA/BRAZIL 
Argentina and Brazil have traditionally been 
considered the leading economic countries not only in the 
Southern Cone, but also in Latin America.  There has been a 
long-standing rivalry between the two countries that has 
led to competing economic and military policies.  Whether 
the competition involved nuclear weapons, arms exports, or 
energy, in the long run these countries have benefited from 
this rivalry through economic growth and development.  From 
the early 1970s through 1999 Argentina and Brazil have seen 
an overall steady growth in GNP.  Economic growth has also 
permitted greater flexibility in military expenditures. 
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Figure 1 represents Brazil’s GNP and military 
expenditures from 1970-1999.51  As seen in this figure, 
military expenditures have remained relatively constant and 
uninfluenced by any increases or decreases to GNP.  During 
the overall debt crisis in Latin America in the early 
1980s, Brazil’s military expenditures remained steady.  
After the Tequila shock in Mexico in 1994, GNP and military 
expenditures rose slightly.  For the most part, military 
expenditures have risen slightly over the twenty-year span, 
but not to the same proportion as GNP.  Based on these 
results, it would appear that Brazil has a long-term and 
consistent expenditure goal for the military, which has 
been less than two percent of GNP.52  The long-term goal is 
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reflected by the return to a constant level of military 
expenditures regardless of economic growth.  A long-term 
expenditure goal makes it easier for a rival country to 
predict future expenditures.53  This will pacify any threats 
a rival country may believe exists based on known military 
expenditures.  On the other hand, Argentina’s experience 
has been different. 
Although Argentina has experienced similar economic 
growth and hardships, its defense expenditures and GNP 
growth have appeared to respond differently than Brazil.  
Figure 2 represents Argentina’s GNP and military 
expenditures from 1970-1999.54 







































































Overall, GNP has seen growth over the twenty-ear 
period for Argentina.  Based on Figure 2, military 
expenditures increased in 1976 and remained on a steady 
increase until 1982.  In 1982, there was a dramatic 
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increase in military expenditures followed by a steady 
decline for the remaining years.  During these periods the 
increase in military expenditures were not correlated to 
the increase in GNP.  As seen in 1982 there was actually a 
decrease in GNP, more than likely due to the debt crisis 
that hit Latin America.  However, the increase in military 
expenditures during that year was more probably contributed 
to factors other than economics.55 
Another dramatic difference between GNP and military 
expenditures occurs in 1991.  Military expenditures decline 
and then level out, while GNP growth soars.  It appears 
that Argentina lacks a long-term expenditure goal similar 
to Brazil.  The military budget seems to be driven by 
short-term isolated non-economic shocks on the system56, 
like external security and government regime 
considerations.57  Therefore economic growth does not drive 
military expenditures in Argentina’s case.  Although 
Argentina and Brazil have had different relationships 
between their GNP and military expenditures, it is 
important to determine whether this was an isolated 
relationship or whether economics determined military 
expenditures in other countries in Latin America. 
C. PERU/ECUADOR 
Peru and Ecuador have had a history of instability 
stemming from the disagreement over a common border and 
access to the Amazon.  Periodically both of these countries 
have decided to militarize and settle their disagreement 
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through the use of force.  Peru and Ecuador are both 
considered among the poorer countries in South America, 
especially compared to Argentina and Brazil.  Their overall 
GNP per capita averages less than 1,500 dollars compared to 
Argentina and Brazil, which have been consistently twice 
that amount.58 











































































Figure 3 represents Peru’s GNP and military 
expenditures from 1970-1999.59  Peru's GNP growth has shown 
an overall increase throughout while declining during time 
of economic crisis in 1982 and 1989.  GNP appears to 
closely lag behind military expenditures.  This would 
initially prove that military expenditures are relatively 
independent of GNP growth.  The increases in military 
expenditures in the years 1976, 1986, and 1992 appear to be 
entirely attributed to another factor other than economic 
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growth.  It just so happens that in all of those years, 
tensions flared between Peru and Ecuador over the disputed 
territory in the Amazon. 
Ecuador is the smaller of the two countries and is 
more constrained by resources than Peru.  Ecuador’s 
military has responded to the Peruvian threat and has also 
desired to gain a tactical advantage over the sheer number 
of Peruvian forces to end the on-going territorial dispute.  
Figure 4 represents Ecuador’s GNP and military expenditures 
from 1970-1999.60 






































































Like the other countries, Ecuador has also experienced a 
consistent growth in GNP of the twenty years.  However, 
unlike the others, Ecuador’s growth can also be attributed 
to its oil resources. 
Military expenditures have not grown with the same 
steadiness as the GNP.  Ecuador’s military expenditures 
appear to have more long-term goal orientation compared to 
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the inconsistency of Peru’s expenditures.  Ecuador has 
spent on the average 2-3 percent of its GNP on defense, 
while Peru has fluctuated between two and seven percent.61  
Since both countries have militarized over the disputed 
territory it would be expected that the military 
expenditures in Figure 3 and Figure 4 would resemble each 
other, but they do not. 
Ecuador’s military has a slight advantage over Peru’s 
military because they used to receive a percentage of the 
country’s oil revenues.  Since the 1970s, the military has 
received a percentage of the oil revenues from 
Petroecuador.62  These revenues have allowed the Ecuadorian 
military to maintain more constant expenditures than Peru 
because at least a portion of the annual budget was always 
guaranteed.  When these revenues disappear, it is expected 
that Ecuador’s military expenditures are to become more 
susceptible to short-term shocks such as Peru and Argentina 
have experienced in the past. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The theories of economic growth and military 
expenditures are divided into two groups.  The first group 
being that military expenditures determine economic growth.  
The second states that economic growth determines military 
expenditures.  However, in the analysis of the two dyad 
cases neither of these theories was completely 
substantiated.  Two different results were formulated. 
It was determined that Brazil had a long-term and 
consistent expenditure goal for the military.  Even though 
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there was an intense rivalry between Argentina and an 
overall growth in GNP throughout the time period, military 
expenditures remained constant.  As for Argentina the 
outcome presented a slightly different result. 
Argentina lacked a long-term expenditure goal.  The 
military budget was driven by short-term isolated non-
economic shocks on the system.  These shocks were in part 
from the external security concerns over Brazil as well as 
the change in government regimes between civilian and 
military during the time period.  Similar patterns with 
Brazil and Argentina were also seen with Peru and Ecuador. 
Peru’s GNP and military expenditure relationship was 
also influenced by short-term shocks.  While there were 
changes to GNP during periods of economic crisis, military 
expenditures appeared to be relatively independent of GNP 
growth.  In 1976, 1986, and 1992 the increase in military 
expenditures could be attributed to the flared border 
tensions with Ecuador. 
Ecuador’s military expenditures appeared to mirror the 
Brazilian model.  Throughout the period, military 
expenditures remained relatively constant.  This showed 
that Ecuador had a reason for a long-term expenditure goal.  
However, the long-term expenditure goal in Ecuador was 
influenced by receipt of yearly oil revenues.  These 
revenues permitted the Ecuadorian military to maintain more 
constant expenditures because a portion of their annual 







IV. U.S. ARM SALES POLICY TO LATIN AMERICA 
The debate over the impact of U.S. arm sales to Latin 
America on regimes in the region has been ongoing since the 
1960s.  Since the end of the Second World War, the United 
States has sold advanced weaponry to Latin America.  The 
tremendous surplus of weapons after the war and the fear of 
Soviet influence both encouraged the United States to 
increase its sales to Latin America.  By the 1960s much of 
the initial wave of weapons sold had become out-of-date or 
not functional, so Latin American countries looked to 
purchase needed upgrades and newer technologies.  The 
growing apprehension of Soviet influence in Latin America 
was further reinforced by the success of Fidel Castro’s 
Cuban revolution.  The support Castro received from the 
Soviet Union prompted U.S. policy makers to increase the 
sales of arms to the region. 
In the 1970s, several Latin American nations 
experienced a wave of particularly brutal military coups 
and dictatorships.  Chile’s coup in 1973 by General Agusto 
Pinochet was one of the most important cases that incited 
the United States to reconsider its arm sales policy 
towards Latin America.  In 1977, due to many human rights 
abuses by Latin American military governments, the United 
States banned the sales of advanced weapon systems to Latin 
America.  Despite the wave of democratization that occurred 
across the region in the 1980s, the ban remained in effect 
until President Clinton lifted it in 1997 again sparking 
debate over the wisdom of U.S. arms sales to Latin America. 
Although recently all countries previously governed by 
military dictatorships have returned to civilian 
governments and their economies have become more liberal, 
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political and economic crisis still dominate the agenda.  
Many of the democracies are young and have not fully 
consolidated, which calls into question the stability of 
their civil-military relations.  Most border disputes 
between nations have been settled, but new security 
concerns such as drug trafficking, growing poverty, and 
armed insurgencies have the potential to disrupt the good 
civil-military relationship in these countries.63 
The reintroduction of U.S. advanced arm sales to Latin 
America has the prospect of altering the fragile security 
balance.  It is important for policy makers to understand 
the implications of their policies in Latin America.  
Traditionally purchasing advanced arms have affected Latin 
America by increasing defense spending and spurring 
competition between rival neighbors leading to an arms 
race.  However, this has not always been the case. 
The recent lifting of the advanced arm sales ban by 
President Clinton has ignited another debate among policy 
makers, defense industry, and scholars over whether lifting 
the ban was a sound foreign policy decision by the Clinton 
Administration.  Many scholars believe this decision will 
instigate a regional arms race, while others contend this 
will be good for the U.S. economy and will reintroduce much 
needed U.S. military influence in the region.  Others 
believe governments will choose to spend their money on 
unnecessary military weapons instead of utilizing it to 
alleviate growing social concerns.  As the debate ensues, 
an overarching question still remains to be answered.  Are 
these arguments by policy makers, defense industry, and 
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scholars regarding the lifting of the arms sales ban to 
Latin America accurate?  I argue that the U.S. political 
decision to lift the arm sales ban to Latin America was 
sound and as seen over the last several years, the lifting 
of the ban will not have the effect that the critics 
predict. 
This chapter will analyze three separate time periods 
of weapon sales to Latin America in order to understand the 
benefits and the ramifications of lifting the U.S. ban on 
arms sales.  The first period analyzed will be 1960-1977.  
Advanced weapon sales increased to Latin America during 
this time as a result of U.S. foreign policy decisions.  
The Nixon Doctrine will be analyzed to determine some of 
the reasons that may have contributed to an arms race 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  President Carter’s 
Presidential Directive #13 that banned the sale of U.S. 
advanced weapons systems to Latin America will also be 
analyzed to show what drove the United States to change its 
policy. 
The second period analyzed will be 1977-1997.  It will 
describe President Reagan’s shift in policy towards arm 
sales to Latin America while the ban was in effect.  
Aircraft sales to the region will be analyzed to see if the 
ban was effective in keeping advanced aircraft out of Latin 
America.  Also the reasons that contributed to President 
Clinton’s issuing of the Presidential Decision Directive 
#34, which lifted the ban, will be shown. 
The third period analyzed will be 1997-2002.  This 
time period was when the ban was lifted.  The arguments for 
and against lifting the advanced weapons ban will be 
analyzed.  These arguments will also show how accurate they 
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were in predicting what is actually happening in Latin 
America today. 
A. 1960-1977 
The 1960s and 1970s were years of change and 
uncertainty for Latin American nations.  It was the height 
of the Cold War and the United States was dealing with the 
antagonistic Soviet Union in a bipolar international world.  
Foreign military sales to Latin America began after World 
War II.  The United States, in an attempt to maintain its 
regional hegemonic power, sold its surplus military 
hardware to Latin America at cost.  This hardware included 
P-47Ds, B-25Js, and other types of military aircraft.64  
During this time the United States experienced an increase 
in competition from European powers.  Latin American 
countries also looked towards Europe to provide them 
another outlet for purchasing military arms.  This greatly 
concerned U.S. policy makers because European arm sales to 
Latin America were seen as a threat to U.S. hegemonic 
stability. 
By the early 1960s, the United States was growing 
uneasy with the situation in Latin America.  The success of 
Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution worried the United 
States because of Castro’s affiliation with the Soviet 
Union.  Once again, U.S. hegemony in the region was 
challenged.  To counter the challenge, the United States 
increased aid to the region through conventional weapon 
sales.65  Many of the weapon systems sold to Latin America 
after World War II were aging and becoming less reliable.  
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There became an increased demand for weapons for 
modernization purposes as well as combating the increasing 
internal security threats that many nations faced.  There 
was a coup in 1964 that prompted Brazil to seek arms to 
modernize its forces and to combat the growing internal 
insurgency in the country.66  As the Brazilian military 
expanded and consolidated its power in government there was 
a greater need for more equipment and arms. 
The United States was able to capitalize on the 
growing requirement for arms in Latin America.  They were 
able to successfully win the competition against the 
European nations and monopolized the market.  Latin 
American nations preferred U.S. arms to other suppliers 
because of the compatibility of support equipment, the 
already trained personnel on U.S. equipment, and the 
reliability of the United States as a supplier.67  Selling 
to Latin American countries promoted a working relationship 
among military members and encouraged a dialogue between 
the United States and purchasing countries. 
The Vietnam War had an effect on the arm transfer 
policy to Latin America.  By 1969, due to the extreme costs 
of American lives and money in the U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam, President Nixon declared the United States would 
no longer get militarily involved in local conflicts.  It 
would be the responsibility of the country to combat their 
conflicts; however the United States would supply them with 
the necessary arms to aid their efforts.  This decree later 
became known as the Nixon Doctrine.  Although initially 
this doctrine applied to Southeast Asia, it was eventually 
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expanded to cover the rest of the world.68  This new 
approach to U.S. foreign policy opened the way for 
increased arm sales to Latin America.  In FY72 Congress 
increased the ceiling total on arm sales to Latin America 
to $100 million and by FY73 it was raised again to $150 
million.69  By 1973 President Nixon lobbied Congress to 
completely eliminate the ceiling on arm sales.  In response 
to the new foreign policy many Latin American countries 
increased defense expenditures during the 1970s and the 
orders for U.S. arms averaged more than $250million 
annually.  Venezuela experienced an influx of money to 
their economy through oil revenues.  In turn, they 
increased their purchases of arms from the United States by 
five times.  Throughout this period, the United States 
supplied seventy-five percent of all the arms transfers to 
twenty-two Latin America countries. 70  The invasion of U.S. 
arms to Latin America would not last long. 
In 1973 a bloody military coup occurred in Chile.  
Human rights atrocities that occurred during and following 
the coup set the stage for a change in U.S. arm sales 
policy.  The human rights violations of the Argentine 
military regime that took power in 1976 added to the 
pressure to change U.S. policy.  The worsening human rights 
trend in Latin America led President Carter to change arm 
sales policy.  He issued Presidential Directive #13 on May 
13, 1977.  This directive stressed the need to restrain the 
transfer of arms to the region.  The new policy placed an 
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emphasis on conducting security assistance programs that 
supported and enhanced human rights in receiving nations.71  
The directive further limited the dollar amount allowed for 
foreign military sales and established requirements for 
newly developed advanced weapon systems.  Some of these 
advanced weapon system requirements included: not being 
able to first supply the region with a new capability; and 
not being able to sell a new weapon system until it was 
operational in U.S. forces.72  This directive remained in 
effect for the next twenty years reminding policy makers of 
their limitations on arm sales to Latin America.  Although 
this limited U.S. arm sales, it would not completely 
eliminate advanced weapon sales to the region by the U.S. 
and other countries. 
B. 1977-1997 
President Carter’s ban on advanced weapons to Latin 
America remained in place for twenty years, yet there were 
a few exceptions.  One of the first tests of the new policy 
occurred during the last years of the Carter presidency.  
Peru inquired about purchasing advanced aircraft from the 
United States.  President Carter refused to sell to Peru.  
In response to the U.S. rejection, Peru requested 
assistance from the Soviet Union.  The Soviets negotiated 
and agreed to sell them several Su-22 fighters.  Peru’s 
purchase triggered an Ecuadorian request for assistance 
from the United States.  Just as occurred with Peru, 
Ecuador was also denied U.S. assistance.  Ecuador turned to 
Israel to purchase their Kfir fighters.  However, due to 
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U.S. influence in Israeli affairs this request was also 
rejected.  Ecuador finally negotiated a settlement with 
France for the purchase of their Mirage F-1s for a sum of 
$260 million dollars.73 This demonstrated that regional 
dynamics could trigger arms races regardless of U.S. policy 
and highlighted the increasing diversity of suppliers 
available to Latin American states. 
The 1980s began a new chapter in U.S. arm sales policy 
towards Latin America.  President Reagan directed arm sales 
policies differently than President Carter.  He believed 
that the United States was responsible for funding and 
supplying arms and training militaries to support 
anticommunist governments in Latin America.  Small arms 
sales were increased to achieve this goal.  Although small 
arms transfers had always been done in the past, President 
Reagan felt the increase was necessary to aid anticommunist 
regimes.  Direct commercial sales to Latin America more 
than doubled from the previous twenty-year period.  From 
1950-1983 total sales were 503.1 million dollars.  However, 
from 1984-1993 total sales increased to 1,339.7 million 
dollars.  Some of the major recipients during the latter 
period were Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Ecuador.74  The United States and other foreign nations 
continued to supply Latin America with combat aircraft and 
other more complex military hardware, although the 
introduction of new major weapons systems by the U.S., such 
as aircraft or armor, continued to be rare. 
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The ban on the selling of advanced weapons was upheld 
during this period with one exception.  In 1982 the Soviet 
Union sold MiG-21 fighters to Cuba to raise the level of 
military capability of the Cuban air force.  Cuba’s new 
purchase worried the United States, so in response twenty-
four state-of-the-art F-16s were sold to Venezuela to kept 
Cuba in check.75  Many other types of combat aircraft were 
sold to Latin America, but not with the same capabilities 
as the F-16.  Between 1985 and 1993 France and Britain 
supplied ten aircraft each to Latin American countries, 
while other NATO countries supplied seventy aircraft and 
the United States supplied 125 aircraft.76  The 125 aircraft 
the United States sold were not advanced combat aircraft.  
Additionally, the types and variants of the U.S. aircraft 
no longer existed in active U.S. inventories.  These types 
of aircraft included the A-4s, F-5s and A-37s.77  Brazil and 
Argentina were the major recipients of the A-4s, while the 
F-5s went to Chile and Brazil, and the A-37s went to Chile 
and Peru.  Other aircraft sales that were supplied by 
Europe were the French Mirage IIIs, 5Ps, 50s, and F-1s and 
the Russian Su-22s and 25s.  The United States was again 
the leading supplier of arms to the region.  It was 
responsible for contributing to one fourth of all arms 
sold, which was three times more than many other nations.78  
Throughout the remainder of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, arm sales to Latin America remained relatively 
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consistent.  The lower-technology aircraft sales kept many 
countries satisfied during the years of the ban. 
Nonetheless, in 1995 Peru and Ecuador purchased advanced 
aircraft, reintroducing them to Latin America. 
Peru and Ecuador had been at odds with each other for 
many years.  A border dispute erupted over a previous 
disagreement involving Ecuador’s lost territory in the 
Amazon basin.  Both countries deployed troops into the area 
and the conflict escalated.  Eventually, Peru and Ecuador 
were able to negotiate a settlement, but the repercussions 
were that each country still distrusted the other.  Peru 
believed it was still vulnerable to a future Ecuadorian 
conflict and pursued a supplier of advanced aircraft.  
Belarus, which had recently gained its independence from 
Russia, agreed to sell eighteen MiG-29s.  The purchase 
induced a response from Ecuador, which turned to Israel and 
acquired the Kfir C-7s.79  Since this conflict and arms 
build-up, the United States began to question the validity 
of the arm sales policy that had been in place the last 
twenty years.  The Peru-Ecuador crisis and past aircraft 
sales from European suppliers demonstrated to the United 
States that the ban had not curved Latin American 
aspirations for more arms.  The aspiration to modernize 
their forces and the ability to obtain advanced weapons 
from other suppliers encouraged U.S. policy makers and 
scholars to revisit the issue surrounding the arm sales 
ban.  The ensuing debate ultimately aided President Clinton 
in deciding the ban was no longer in the U.S. interest. 
C. 1997-2002 
August 1, 1997 President Clinton issued Presidential 
decision Directive #34 that lifted the twenty-year ban on 




advanced weapon sales to Latin America.  It stated that 
advanced weapons sales would be permitted on a case-by-case 
basis as long as the sale supported the U.S. underlying 
goals of strengthening democracy, focusing resources on 
needed social programs, preventing arms races, and 
modernizing defense forces with restraint.80  President 
Clinton decided to lift the ban because Latin American 
countries changed over the past twenty years.  All the 
countries were now democracies with civilian control of 
their militaries and human rights abuses had disappeared.  
The lifting of the ban started a heated debate over the 
possible implications for Latin America. 
Table 1.   Arm Sales Debate 
Advocates of lifting the ban Critics of lifting the ban 
Strengthen Democracy Weaken Democracy 
Increase U.S. Military 
Influence 
Detract from Social Programs 
 Lead to a Regional Arms Race 
 
Many critics believed that if the ban was lifted 
advanced weapon purchases would undermine social programs, 
weaken democracy, and destabilize regional security through 
an arms race.  On the other hand, advocates ensured that 
these areas would not be affected like critics argued, but 
that arm sales would in fact strengthen democracy and U.S. 
military influence in the region. 
According to the critics, the lifting of the ban would 
affect economics.  They argued that poverty was an 
important economic issue that governments need to address.  
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Thirty-six percent of the population of Latin America lived 
in poverty and this percentage has not changed much over 
the past ten years.  Some of the reasons for this had been 
low savings and investment rates, bad fiscal discipline of 
the government, and debt servicing.81  All of these factors 
potentially took money away from social programs.  As far 
as defense spending, there had not been an increase in 
expenditures.  In actuality some defense budgets were cut 
as occurred in Brazil and Argentina.  On average, the 
region spent 1.3 percent of GDP on defense.  This was lower 
than the world average of 2.3 percent.  In countries like 
Chile where the military received ten percent of the copper 
revenues and Ecuador where the military received fifteen 
percent of the oil revenues, the money for arms for their 
militaries would come from these sources and not from 
intended social programs. 82  This indicated that countries 
were not choosing arms over social programs, although it is 
likely that the Chilean or Ecuadorian civilian governments 
would have preferred to spend reserved military funds on 
programs other than military acquisitions. 
Another way the critics argued the ban would affect 
Latin America was by weakening democratic stability.  They 
believed that allowing Latin American countries the 
opportunity to purchase advanced weapons from the United 
States would build military strength that could weaken 
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civil-military relations.  All countries in Latin America 
had some degree of civilian control over the military, 
although this varied from country to country.  Since the 
transition to civilian governments all militaries had 
progressively lost autonomy over time.  This varied from 
country to country, but the overall trend had declined and 
not increased in recent years.  Militaries would always 
look for opportunities to upgrade or replace their existing 
equipment because weapon systems break and wear out over 
time.   
If militaries are not allowed to modernize their 
equipment and weapons and focus on external security 
concerns then they would search for other tasks and 
interests within the domestic arena.  These tasks may range 
from paving roads, building schools, economic distribution, 
to politics.  While the military provides the civilian 
community with several goods and services, it would 
ultimately be tempted into becoming too involved with 
internal politics and economics.  These are not traditional 
roles of the military and may cause similar military coups 
that many Latin American countries witnessed during the 
1960s and 1970s.  However, as seen during the 1977-1997 
period, many nations still bought aircraft from the United 
States to maintain and upgrade their capabilities, but the 
weapon systems were not the most advanced when compared to 
active U.S. forces.  Additionally, during this period many 
military budgets and personnel were downsized as a result 
of transitioning governments. 
Critics believed the greatest implication of lifting 
the ban was a change in regional security.  They believed 
that an arms race would ensue that would disrupt the 
stability that the region worked hard to achieve.  Evidence 
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of an arms race was seen in the 1977-1997 period.  There 
were a couple of instances where countries purchased arms 
in response to another country’s purchase.  The first 
example happened between Peru and Ecuador in the beginning 
of the ban’s existence.  When Peru purchased the Su-22s 
from Russia, this prompted Ecuador to purchase the Kfir 
fighters from Israel.  Although the initial sale was 
blocked by the United States, they proceeded to purchase 
Mirage F-1s from France.83  The second example was later in 
the period when Peru and Ecuador disagreed again over 
territory in the Amazon basin.  When Peru bought the MiG-
29s from Belarus this triggered Ecuador to buy Kfir C-7s 
from Israel.  In the period from 1997-2002 only Chile and 
Brazil requested to purchase F-16s from the United States, 
totaling $636 million and $909 million respectively.84  
Neither Chile nor Brazil had a security threat with each 
other and they had good bilateral diplomatic relations.  
These two countries desired to replace their aging combat 
aircraft they currently possess.  To further prove the 
point, Brazil recently decided to postpone their F-16 
purchase and focus on needed social issues.  Based on these 
examples it would be difficult to suggest that the ban was 
effective in preventing arms races in the region.  So by 
lifting the ban the United States was able to take 
advantage of an additional $7 billion dollars in arm 
sales.85  However, as recent procurements have shown an arms 
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race has not begun.  Even Latin American countries have 
preferred not to promote new arm sales to the region. 
As it has been shown in the past, Latin American 
countries have welcomed advanced weapons with open arms.  
However, with the exception of Brazil and Chile, this view 
has shifted for others.  Argentina is currently going 
through tough economic troubles.  It does not have enough 
money to purchase the weapon systems and does not want its 
military personnel lobbying for new weapons purchases to 
compete with or deter neighboring countries.  Although Chile 
has agreed to purchase F-16s, it does not want to feel like 
it got a special deal.86  Brazil, one of the richest 
countries, has remained neutral because it still has not 
completely ruled out the possibility of purchasing aircraft 
in the future. 
Critics have failed to realize that there are positive 
aspects to lifting the arms sales ban.  The reintroduction 
of advanced weapon sales would strengthen democracy in the 
region.  By modernizing the military and its weapon systems 
it will continue to aid the professionalization process that 
began years earlier.  The modernization of weapons also 
instills the military with a sense of pride and purpose 
among the civilian community, which in turn encourages the 
civilians to show respect and gratitude for their security 
and protection.87  Democracy will be strengthened because 
the military will be kept out of the internal workings of 
the country since they understand their mission and role in 
society.  They will focus on the external missions and 
security concerns that their weapons systems were designed 
to counter. 
Purchasing weapons from the United States will also 
strengthen democracy by reinitiating communications between 
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defense institutions in the United States and the Latin 
American countries.  The open communications would allow for 
the sharing of information and the ability for the United 
States to exert more influence in the region.  The open 
dialogue enables the United States to more closely monitor 
Latin American military procurement, budget resources, and 
weapons inventories, while giving Latin American militaries 
the opportunity to develop and modernize.  The U.S. and 
Latin American militaries would also benefit professionally 
from the ban’s lifting. 
The U.S. military lost influence in Latin America 
during the years of the ban.  Since only lower-technology 
U.S. aircraft, which had not existed in U.S. inventories, 
were sold, limited training opportunities existed between 
the United States and Latin American nations.  By the 1990s 
the training schools for the A-4, F-5 and A-37 were closed.  
Selling the F-16s affords Chilean and Brazilian pilots the 
opportunity to receive flight training in the United 
States.  Flying similar aircraft would provide Latin 
American militaries a better understanding of U.S. forces 
and the way they operate.  More multinational and joint 
exercises would be scheduled to improve interoperability 
and communications between the United States and Latin 
American militaries.88  This added training, exercises, and 
communication ultimately would improve U.S military 
influence in the region. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
By the 1960s Latin America became desperate to upgrade 
and modernize their forces, so Europe and the United States 
competed for their arms bids.  In light of the events of 
the Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine was created.  The 
Nixon Doctrine provided the environment for the drastic 




build-up of arms in Latin America during the late 1960S to 
early 1970S.  The region suffered many military coups 
coupled with massive human right violations, which 
compelled President Carter to ban advanced arm sales to the 
Latin American region. 
The years of the ban forced Latin America to look 
towards Europe and the Soviet Union to supply them with 
advanced arms.  While there were only two instances of 
advanced weapon sales during this period, there were many 
sales of lower-technology weapons.  Due to the return of 
democratic governance, President Clinton lifted the ban in 
1997, which generated a heated debate over the advantages 
and ramifications of the new policy.  The debate covered a 
variety of concerns, but the most important issues were 
social programs, weakening of democracy, and regional 
security. 
Military spending has not detracted from social 
program budgets because the military budgets for the past 
several years had been stagnant or decreasing.  Democracy 
actually strengthened and not weakened since the lifting of 
the ban because most militaries considerably down sized 
personnel and governments maintained a relative degree of 
civilian control.  Lastly, regional security remained 
stable.  Only Chile and Brazil expressed serious interest 
in purchasing advanced arms.  These new sales would however 
improve U.S. military influence in the region through 
interoperability, communication, and joint exercises.  Arm 
sales would also encourage open communications between 
similar democratic institutions, which would only continue 
to strengthen democracy and aid Latin America in it pursuit 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The debate over lifting the arm sales ban to Latin 
America has brought many new issues to light and has settled 
old debates.  However, the most important of these issues is 
the stability of the regional security system.  Many critics 
believed that when President Clinton lifted the arm sales 
ban in 1997 that this would instigate an arms race 
throughout the region.  They believe that the political and 
the economic conditions in the region still allow an arms 
race to occur and the previous policy of the arms sales ban 
prevented arms races from occurring in the past.  This 
thesis argues that contrary to the critics view, an arms 
race is not occurring today.  The lifting of the ban has 
done nothing to initiate an arms race today and there are 
explanations that support this. 
There are three explanations for why an arms race has 
not occurred.  One explanation is that of the emergence of 
the zone of democratic peace and complex interdependence in 
the region provides too many ideological and structural safe 
guards against an uncontrolled violent escalation and 
competitive build-up of weapons.  The second explanation is 
there is a substantial relationship between GNP growth and 
military expenditures in an arms race.  The military 
expenditures of the two rival dyad cases that I examined are 
independent of each other, which suggest they are not 
necessarily competing against each other in terms of arms 
acquisitions because the constraints imposed by fragile 
economies limit their ability to do so.  The last 
explanation is that U.S. foreign policy has been a neutral 
factor in limiting or preventing arms sales.  Historical 
data shows that Latin American nations will purchase 
weapons, even advanced weapons, when they want from 




A. DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE  
Chapter II explored the applicability of democratic 
peace and complex interdependence theories.  After a 
theoretical review, the principals of the two theories were 
each applied to a case.  The first case was the long-time 
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.  The competition for 
hegemony and natural resources led these two countries into 
an intense rivalry.  Once Argentina realized it could no 
longer compete with the size and power of Brazil it knew the 
only way to gain from the situation was through compromise. 
The normative ideas of the democratic regime in 
Argentina and Brazil understood negotiations and compromise.  
The regime knew ultimately it would gain more through 
cooperation than competition.  Both countries also 
understood and accepted the involved costs to continuing the 
competitive rivalry.  The new interdependent relationship 
encouraged the opening of multiple communication channels, 
which limited the role for the use of military force to 
settle disputes and did not place an established hierarchy 
among any issues. 
The second case involved Peru and Ecuador’s border 
dispute.  This case represented how the democratic peace 
theory applied to Latin America.  These two countries showed 
how war and arms racing only happened when at least one of 
the countries was not democratic.  However, when both were 
democratic they were able to resolve their dispute without 
further conflict.  The normative ideals of self-preservation 
and material well being regardless of cultures and beliefs 
tied with the structural components of democracy ensures 
there are common checks and restraints placed on the system 
to limit the use of force in a conflicting situation.  This 
was seen in the resolution of the border dispute.  
Ultimately, no matter how many arms these countries have or 
may desire to obtain, the fundamental ideals and structure 
of democracy along with interdependence will prevent them 
from arms racing against each other. 
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B. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
Chapter III explained the relationship between economic 
growth and military expenditures in the two dyads of 
Argentina/Brazil and Peru/Ecuador.  These two dyads showed 
that the relationship between GNP and military expenditures 
were not as simple as the “Guns for Butter” trade-off.  In 
Argentina’s case, the military expenditures were more 
erratic compared to GNP growth.  The inconsistency of 
defense spending was correlated to short-term security 
shocks on the system.  In Brazil’s case its military 
expenditures were steadier over the period.  This stability 
subjected a long-term goal for military spending regardless 
of GNP growth because spending always returned to a constant 
level.  When the military expenditures of the two rival 
countries were compared, there was no sign of competitive 
spending. 
For the Peru/Ecuador case the results were similar.  
Peru’s military expenditures were independent of economic 
growth. The increases in defense spending occurred in 
response to an increase in border tensions and not economic 
growth.  This indicated that Peru’s expenditures were also 
influenced by short-term shocks similar to Argentina, while 
Ecuador on the other hand maintained a more stable 
expenditure pattern.  Ecuador was able to maintain a 
consistent expenditure level with the annual oil revenue the 
military received. 
The review of the relationship between GNP growth and 
military expenditures for these two cases suggest there is 
not a concrete explanation for whether economics can promote 
or prevent an arms race from occurring.  However, what the 
data does show is that militaries with long-term expenditure 
goals may suppress any initiation of an arms race because 
defense spending is more constant and predictable.  This 
predictability would contrast with arms racing because most 
arms races mainly involve increased short-term military 
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expenditures in response to a rivals’ previous increase in 
expenditures. 
C. U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY TO LATIN AMERICA 
Chapter IV explored the last possible explanation for 
why an arms race does not exist today and that is U.S. 
foreign policy.  A review of over thirty years of U.S. arms 
sales policy leads to the conclusion that it does not 
matter.  From 1960-1977 the United States followed the 
policy set forth by the Nixon Doctrine.  This doctrine 
allowed Latin American countries to combat their own 
conflicts with supplied U.S. arms.  What followed was a 
tremendous influx of advanced weapons to the region, which 
many critics believed sparked a slue of military coups and 
human rights abuses.  From 1977-1997, the United States 
attempted to enforce an arms sales ban prohibiting all 
advance weapons from being sold to the region.  Although the 
ban was in place, it did little to prevent advanced weapons 
from being sold.  Many Latin American countries bought 
advanced weapons from Europe, Soviet Union, and Eastern 
Block countries.  Following this period the political 
landscape changed. 
By 1997, all countries were democracies with civilian 
control of the militaries and human rights abuses had 
disappeared.  The ban was lifted to reintroduce U.S. 
military influence and continue to strengthen democracy 
throughout the region.  However, everyone did not share this 
view.  Critics insisted that lifting the ban would weaken 
democracy, detract money from social programs, and initiate 
an arms race.  In actuality, democratic governments have 
continued to strengthen control over their militaries, 
decrease military expenditures, while only two non-rival 
countries have expressed an interest in purchasing advance 





The theories of democratic peace and complex 
interdependence in Chapter II offer the most likely 
explanation for why an arms race is not occurring in Latin 
America today.  Ever since democracy has spread throughout 
the region, traditionally rival countries are resolving 
disputed issues through means other than military force.  
So if military force is no longer the primary means of 
issue settlement, there is not a need to arms race.  While 
economic determinants to military expenditures in Chapter 
III present another possible avenue to explain an absence 
of an arms race, it does not offer any definite supporting 
evidence.  However, Chapter III does show there are two 
ways to categorize military expenditures.  One way is 
through long-term goals and the other way is through short-
term shocks.  These ways will help predict how a country’s 
military expenditures will react to economic and security 
concerns.  Lastly, Chapter IV concluded that U.S. foreign 
policy was determined to be a neutral factor for either 
supporting or preventing an arms race.  As seen through 
history, Latin American countries will determine for 
themselves when they purchase advanced weapons.  Even with 
the establishment of a ban, Latin American countries 
purchased advanced weapons from other non-participating 
countries.  As the United States continues to have an open 
dialogue with Latin America, support for democracy and 
future arm sales will be instrumental for maintaining a 
successful policy in the region and reducing the 
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